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I. INTRODUCTION 
I have previously given Skolem and Herbrand theorems 
for various classical logics [3,4,5]. In this paper I 
will consider intuitionistic logic. Mints has given a 
counterexample to the ordinary Herbrand theorem [6]. His 
example is VxVy(Fax v Fby) - azau Fzu • The formula is 
easily seen to be not provable in LI but both its Skolem 
transform and its Herbrand transforms are. 
In this paper I hope to clear up the matter further. 
As in LK I will split the theory up into two parts - a 
Skolem theory and an Perbrand theory. The difficulties 
will be seen to only come in in the Skolem theory. It 
is not true in general that the Skolem morphisms are 
falsifiability morphisms. Everything else works as in 
LK • 
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II. THE FOill~L SYSTEM LI • 
We give a sequential formulation of intuitionistic logic LI, 
following the development of LK [3]: 
LA...l\JGUAGE 
Propositional constant .A.. (the falsity) 
Connectives 
Quantifiers 
Parameters 
Variables 
Functionsymbols and constants e, f 1,f2 ,---,g,h,---
Predicate symbols P1 ,P2 ,---,Q,R,---
In the usual way we build up 
Terms 
Atomic formulae 
Finite (and empty) sequences of formulae r 1,r2 ,--,6,A,--
Sequents 
THE CALCULUS LI • On the language we build the sequential cal-
culus LI in the usual way: 
AXIOMS: 
STRUCTURAL RULES: 
Permutation r ... 6 r * 7(-... !'::, 
for A atomic 
where r* is obtained from 
r by a permutation of for-
mulae, and similarly t::,* from 
6 • 
Thinning 
Contraction 
Trivial rule 
LOGICAL RULES: 
}1\. ... 
-offi. 
w ... 
... w 
... y 
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r,F,F ... t:,. 
r,F ... t:,. 
r ... 6 
r ~F. ... 6 
r, M F. 6 ... iE I J. 
r ... F.,6 
---
r ... M F., 6 
i EI J. 
--- r ,F .... ~:; J 
r, w F .... 6 
iEI J. 
r ... F.,6 
J 
r ... 6 
where 
where we have 
finite branching 
F. is 
J 
one of the 
conjm1ets in M F. iEI J. 
where we have as premisses 
r ... F. s 6 
J 
for all j E I • 
as -~M 
as M _, 
r -- F 6 r G ... 6 
r,F =>G ... 6 
r,F _. G 
r-~F::>G 
r,Ft _, G 
r,VxFx ... G 
r ... Fa 
r ... lfxFx 
t is a term 
a is a parameter not in 
r ... VxFx 
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a .... r 1Fa ... 6 a is a parameter not in 
r, 3:xFx .... 6 
r,axFx ... 6 
.... a r .... Ftz6 t is a term 
r .... 3:xFx,6 
This completes the description of our formal system LI • 
Note the succedents in .... ~ and .... Y • 
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III. COMPLETENESS THEOREM 
There are a number of completenesstheorems in the littera-
ture. Our approach below is similar to the ones of Fitting [1], 
G5rnemann [2] and SchUtte [7]. 
We want to construct trees corresponding to classical trees. 
In LK it did not make any difference which formula we analyzed 
first as long as we did the analysis in a systematic way. In LI 
it makes a lot of difference. The reason is that in analyzing 
~ and V in succedent we lose information. To take care of 
that we construct not only a tree but a tree of trees (or a forest 
of trees as we shall say). 
DEFINITION Fix a sequent. A forest of trees over the sequent 
will be a tree of trees of sequents with the one sequent tree of 
the given sequent at the bottom node. Between each tree in the 
forest and its successortrees we have the following 4 possibili-
ties: 
1 • 
r1 
(We write single lines as indicating the branches in the 
trees and double lines for the branches in the forest.) 
l Here we have the same trees 
.... 61 rN .... .6N above except for r1 .... 61 ' ••• I I •• , r N .... 6N instead of r .... 6 • 
' 
r1 .... 61, ••• ,rN .... 
.6N and r .... .6 / are connected as one of the 
rules of LI except the rules 
I 
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2. 
The tree above is the same as the one 
below except that we have r ... 6 in-
ll stead of r-+ F::)G~t:,. and we have added 
successor node to r ... 6 with a new 
sequent r,F ... G 
• 
r-+F::)G,6 
3. 
Fa 
The tree above is the same as the one 
below except that vre have r -+ 6 in-
stead of r .... VxFx,6 and we have added 
a new successor node to r .... 6 with se-
quent r ... Fa 
' 
where a is a parameter 
not in r _, VxFx • 
r ... VxFx, 6 
4. 
I 
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Here r 1 ~ ~ 1 in the tree below 
is at one of the successornodes to 
r2 ~F ~ ~::, 2 • 
The tree above is the same as the 
one below except that we have 
This concludes the definition of forest of trees. 
It is with possibilities 2 and 3 that we build new nodes. Possi-
bility 4 is an auxiliary construction. Vie will show below that 
we do not need possibility 4 in finite secured intuitionistic 
forests. More about this later. 
For the forests we develop some of the usual theory. 
PRECEDES, SUCCEEDS. As in LK [3] 9 we give 'immediately preceoos 
as formula/ formula part 1 and can hence define 1 precedes as for-
mula', 'precedes as formulapart', 'succeeds as formula', 'sue-
ceeds as formulapart', 'in the same strand', 'analysis'. 
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POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE We define positive and negative occur-
rences in a sequent r .... 6 inductively by: 
i) Any formula in 6 occurs positively in r- 6 • 
ii) Any formula in r occurs negatively in r .... 6 
iii) If MF. or WF. occurs positively (negatively) in r - 6 t 
l l 
then each Fi occurs positively (negatively) in r- 6 • 
iv) If F ~ G occurs positively (negatively) in r .... 6 , then 
F occurs negatively (positively) and G occurs positively 
(negatively) in r .... 6 •. 
v) If VxFx or :HXFx occurs positively (negatively) in r .... 6 , 
then Fx occurs positively (negatj.vely) in r .... 6 • 
GENERAL AND RESTRICTED Vx in r .... 6 is general (restricted) 
if it occurs positively (negatively) as VxFx in r .... 6 • ~xFx 
is restricted (general) if it occurs positively (negatively) as 
xFx in r .... 6 . 
NODES We assume that we have a system of notation for nodes in 
trees. We write ~ for the usual tree-ordering of nodes. 
TERMS BELONGING TO A NODE Given a forest c-:-:1- of trees over 
i) 
A term t belongs to the node . !L "f ln .::r l : 
The node G-v occurs in one of the trees of Jl . 
ii) t is built up from 
a) symbols from r .... 6 
b) the constant e 
c) parameters introduced by .... V or ~.... at nodes v 
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INTUITIONISTIC FOREST An intuitionistic forest c-f over a se-
quent r - 6 is a forest of trees over r - 6 such that 
i) the terms introduced by V - or - ~ at a node in ~ be-
long to the node in Jf 
ii) parameters introduced in - V or ~..... are distinct if we 
analyze quantifiers not in the same strand or with distinct 
analysis or in distinct nodes, m~d 
iii) there is a well-order of the parameters such that for any 
parameter a introduced by - V or ~- in tree T in Y 
all parameters occurring in trees below T are less than 
a (in the well-order). 
Conditions i'i (with a change) and iii are well known from our 
previous papers [3,4,5]. Condition i is new. Observe that the 
further up a node is, the more terms belong to it. In the coun-
termodels to a sequent r- 6 , with p/LI r ..... 6 , we produce be-
low, the terms belonging to a node will constitute the domain at 
the node. To prove "There is a secured intuitionistic forest 
over r- 6 => J- r ..... 6" LI it is necessary that the terms at 
a node v does not depend on parameters introduced by - V or 
~ ..... in nodes above v • 
SECURE]) A node in a tree is secured if it contains an axiom. 
A tree is secured if it contains a aecured node. A branch in a 
forest is secured if it contains a secured tree. A forest is se-
cured if all its branches are. 
FINITENESS LEMMA For any sequent r - 6 , if there is a se-
cured intuitionsistic forest over r- 6 ,then there is a finite 
secured intuitionistic forest over r- 6 • 
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STANDARD FOREST A forest is standard if the nodes are only 
connected by possibilities 1,2,3. i.e. we do not need possibility 
4. 
PROVABILITY LEr~A If we have a finite secured standard forest 
over r ..... 6 , then .,_ LI r ..... 6 • 
Proof: 
We can assume that all the top-most trees in the forest Y are 
secured. 
By induction startmng with the top-most trees we then prove that 
every tree contains a se~uent provable in LI • 
So for example say we have used possibility 1 and that all the 
trees above contain LI-provable se~uents. We must prove that 
the tree below contains an LI-provable se~uent. 
Now either we have an LI-provable se~uent in one of the trees f 
above which is also in the tree below, or 1- LI r1 ..... 61 , --- ,1-LI r N ..... 
_, A 
'"'N • But in the last case f.- LI r ..... 6 • 
QED 
The task now is to prove that if we have a finite secured intui-
tionistic forest over r ..... 6 , then there is a finite se~uced 
standard intuitionistic forest over r ..... 6 • 
The trick is to show that we can to some extent permute the appli-
cations of the possibilities 1,2,3,4. We formulate the lemmata 
on permutations of the applications a little sloppy but will show 
with examples below how to make it precise. 
LEI\I.Il'v1A 1 If we have an application of possibility 1 at node v 
immediately after any other application at node ~ when not 
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u ~ v then we can permute the applications. 
LEMMA 2 If we have an application of possibility 1 at node v 
immediately after an application of 2,3~4 at node v then we can 
permute the applications. 
EXAMPLES 
1 • 
2. 
.... Ft .... Ft 
~ I 
_. A .... B 
'\-1/ 
t 
->A 
lc 
H 
t 
.... Ft 
r 
.... A/\B 
H 
f 
->3:xFx 
I 
->A/\B 
.... A ->B 
1 C VD f 
'\ /~cvn 
l 
.... A A.B 
t 
.... C VD 
gives 
gives 
I 
->Ft 
I 
-+A 
ti 
J 
I 
->Ft 
I 
.... B 
H 
I 
.... ax:Fx .... 3:xFx 
t 
I 
.... A 
J 
.... C,C VD 
~ 
t 
t 
....B 
t 
--c,cvD 
/ 
I 
-+A/\B 
I 
->C,C VD 
H 
I 
.... A/\B 
J 
.... cvD,CvD 
H 
I 
.... A /\B 
t 
.... C vD 
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3. 
-+Fa -+Fa 
1 
_. Gt _. Gt 
It t1 
_.Fa gives -+VxFx 
... axGx ... Gt 
II H 
-+ \fxFx --VxFx 
I 
-+ :!f.xGx -+ 3::x:Gx 
Observe above that a cannot occur in t since a is intro-
duced at a node which is above the node t belongs to. This is 
the place where the assumption on the terms introduced by --~ 
or V ... in intuitionistic forests comes in. 
Using the permutations we get: 
LEMMA Given a finite secured intui tionistic forest over r ..... 6.. 
There is then a finite secured intuitionistic forest Jr over 
r ... 6. such that any application of possibility 1 of node v 
precedes all applications of possibility 7 at nodes ~ v , and 
precedes all applications of possibilities 2,3,4 at nodes ~ v • 
Observe now that if we have a forest as above then the appli-
cations of possibility 4 are of the form r 2 ,F ... 62 
r1'F ... 6. 1 
II 
r2 ... 62 
r1 ,F ... 6.1 
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where F is already in r 2 or was in the antecedent of the node 
when it was formed by an application of possibility 2 or 3. That 
is we can change the application of possibility 4 wuth an appli-
cation of possibility 1 (using contraction rule). 
LEMMA Given a sequent. If we have a finite secured intuition-
istic forest over r ~ ~, thenwe can find a finite secured stan-
dard intuitionistic forest over r ~ 6 • 
PROVABILITY THEOREM For any sequent r ~ 6 , if we have a 
secured intui tionistic forest over r ~ 6 , then - LI r - 6 • 
With the provability theorem, the hard part is done towards the 
completeness theorem. 
ANALYZING BRANCH c-A branch !3 in an intui tionistic forest .!I' 
is an analyzing branch when: 
i) 
ii) 
if MF. occurs in an antecedent at node v in a tree of 
1 
S , then each Fi occurs as a successor to ~Fi in an 
antecedent at node v in S 
if MF. occurs in a succeedent at node v in S , then at 
1 
least one Fi occurs as a sucessor to £Fi in a succeedent 
at node v in S ; 
iii) if WFi occurs in an antecedent at node v in S , then 
iv) 
v) 
at least one F. 
1 
occurs as a successor to 
cedent at node v in ~ 
if WF. 
1 
occurs in a succeedent at node v 
each F. 
1 
occurs as a successor to WF. in 
l 
node v in s . 
' 
if F ::J G occurs in an antecedent at node 
either F occurs as a successor to F :::> G 
WF. 
1 
in s 
in an ante-
' 
then 
a succeedent at 
v in s 
' 
then 
in a succeedent 
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at node v in ~ or G occurs as a successor to F ~ G 
in an antecedent at node v in ~ ; 
vi) if F ~ G occurs in a succedent at node v in ~ , then 
there is a node ~ ~ v such that F occurs in an antede-
vii) 
viii) 
ix) 
x) 
dent and G in a succeedent as successors to F ~ G at 
node ~ in ~ 0 
' 
if VxFx occurs in an antecedent at node v in ~ 0 then 
' 
for every term t belonging to v in ~ 
' 
Ft occurs 
in an antecedent at node v in ~ 
if VxFx occurs in a succeedent at node v in ~ 
' 
then 
there is a node 1-.l ~ \) and a term .L belonging to ~ such lJ 
that Ft occurs as a successor to VxFx in a succeedent 
at node ~ in ~ . 
' 
if llicFx occurs in an antecedent at node \) in s . then 
' 
there is a term t belonging to \) such that Ft occurs 
as a successor to axFx in an antecedent at node \) in f3 ; 
if 3:.x:Fx occurs in a succeedent at node \) in ~ 
' 
then 
for every term t belonging to v , Ft occurs in a suc-
e~~dent at node v in p ; and 
xi) if any formula F occurs in an antecedent at node v in 
s and ~ > v , then there occurs an F as a successor 
in an antecedent at node ~ in S • 
ANALYZING FOREST An intuitionistic forest is analyzing if all 
its branches are. 
With only the obvious changes from LK we prove: 
ANALYZING LEMMA To any sequent we can find an analyzing in-
tuitionistic forest over it. 
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FALSIFIABILITY LEMMA If we have a not-secured analyzing branch 
~ in an intuitionistic forest over r ~ 6 , then we can find a 
falsifying Kripke model of r ~ 6 • 
Proof: 
Assume ~ as above. 
We construct the Kripke model as follows: 
The modelstructure is given by the nodes occuring in ~ and the 
4- ordering between them. 
The domain at node v is the set of terms belonging to node v • 
An atomic formula is true at node v if and only if it occurs in 
an antecedent at v in ~ • 
By induction over the length of formulae we prove that every for-
mula occuring at v in S is true at v if it occurs in an an-
tecedent and false at v if it occurs in a succeedent. 
This gives the lemma. 
QED 
SOUNDNESS LEMMA For any sequent r .... 6 , if I- LI r .... 6 , then 
there are no falsifying Kripke-models of r .... 6 • 
COMPLETENESS THEOREM For any sequent r ~ 6 ~ 1-LI r .... 6 if 
and only if there are no falsifying Kripke-models of it. 
CONSISTENCY THEOREM For any sequent r .... 6 we have exactly 
one of i and ii below 
i) a secured intuitionistic forest over r .... 6 
ii) an intuitionistic forest over r .... 6 with not-secured ana-
lyzing branch. 
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IV. THE SKOLEM THEOREM 
In this section we develop the Skolem theory. We can carry 
the Skolem morphisms and the proof that they are provability mor-
phisms directly over from LK • But this is also all we can do. 
There are a number of obstructions to proving that they are falsi-
fiability morphisms. 
MORPHISMS An intuitionistic morphism is a transformation of 
intuitionistic forests into intuitionistic forests preserving the 
tree structure. A Erovability morphism is an intuitionistic mor-
phism which transforms secured forests into secured forests. An 
analyzi~orphism transforms analyzing forests into analyzing 
forests. A falsifiability morphism transforms analyzing not-se-
cured forests into analyzing not-secured forests. An intuition-
istic isomorphism is an intuitionistic morphism which is both a 
provability and a falsifiability morphism. 
SKOLEM TRANSFORM As in LK [3] we define the Skolem trans-
forms and s . 
SKOLEM MORPHISM As in LK [3] with the obvious changes we 
define ? ~ and j, . 
Following [3] we prove 
THEOREM $> and ~ ~ are provability morphisms. 
We will now discuss the obstructions to proving that the Skolem-
morphisms are intuitionistic isomorphisms. 
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There are two main obstructions: 
i) ~ is not in general an analyzing morphism. 
ii) The strong analyzing lemma is not true in LI • 
OBSTRUCTION 1 : Not analyzing morphism. 
The problem comes in in our formulation of intuitionistic 
forest. At a node v we are only allowed to put terms belonging 
to the node. Say we have a parameter a in an intuitionsistic 
forest :7 over r ... 6 not belonging to the bottom node. After 
performing ~ a goes over into a term t built up from the 
constant e and symbols from s(r ... 6) • In ~(9) t belongs 
to the bottom mode and we should analyze restricted quantifiers 
in the bottom node with t • This is opposed to the sutuation in 
1'7" ~ where we should not analyze restricted quantifiers in the bot-
tom node with a • A counterexample to the full Skolem theorem 
using this obstruction is lfx(A v Bx) .... A v lfxBx • The sequent 
is not provable in LI , but its Skolem transform "'Vx(A v Bx) .... 
-+A v Bf is. If we write dovvn an analyzing intuitionistic forest 
over lfx(A v Bx) .... A v lfxBx , it is easy to see what goes wrong. 
Now we can prove that the sequent above is the only type of 
sequent that goes wrong under this obstruction. Namely: 
i) Let LG be the sequential calculus we get by changing 
_, 1f to 
... "if' r ... Fa 2 t 
r ... 'fX]1X, 6 
ii) LG is equivalent to LI + Cut + 
a does not occur 
in r ... lfxFx,6 
+ the schema 'lfx (A v Bx) ... A v 'fxBx' • 
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iii) Gornemann has proved in her thesis that LG is complete 
for Kripke-models of constant domains [2]. This follows 
also from the below. 
iv) Change the condition on the terms introduced by y ... and 
--3: in intuitionistic forest to be: 
the terms shall be built up from symbols in r ... 6 
' 
the constant e and parameters introduced by ... if or 
3:-- somewhere in the forest. 
Call the new forests LG-forests 
v) In the work of Gornemann [2] she proves: 
If we have a secured LG-forest over r ... 6 , 
then 1- LG r ... 6 • 
vi) With the obvious changes in the definition of analyzing 
branch and analyzing LG-forest we follow the theory above 
for LI . 
vii) We get LG complete for Kripke-models of constant domain. 
viii) Now following the theory of LK [3] we prove: 
a. > and ?~ are LG-provability morphisms. 
b. ? and ~~ are LG-analyzing morphismsa 
We are now left with 
OBSTRUCTION 2 : The strong analyzing lemma is false. 
This is a much more serious threat to our theory than obstruction 
1. The only problem in the strong analyzing lemma comes in in 
the analysis of ~ in the antecedent. It turns out that we are 
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forced to analyze r, F ::) G _, !J. by F ::) G , r, G _, !J. and r, F ::) G _, 
... F,A • In the last sequents we see that we may hence have two 
copies of the same general quantifier in one occurrence of a node, 
Instead of the strong analyzing lemma where we try to handle 
all general quantifiers sumultaneously we can make a lemma which 
handles one general quantifier at a time. Using such a lemma one 
can prove: 
THEOREM r ~ 6 is a sequent. Assume that the general quanti-
fier x at position n in r ... 6 , does not occur in a nagative 
subformula F ::) G of r ~ 6 • 
Then $; 
and ~; 
is a falsifiability LG-morphism. 
is an LG-isomorphism. 
The proof is straightforward from the hints above. That the 
theorem is still not satifactory can be seen from the counterex-
amples to getting rid of the extra assumption: 
'fx -, ., Fx _, -..., 'fxFx 
A ::) 3:xFx -+ 3:x ( A ::) Fx) 
Neither of the sequents are LG-provable but both have Skolem-
transform which are. One could b e for the following approach 
to give a Skolem-theorem: 
Construct a new logic by throwing in as axioms all sequents 
with LI-provable Skolem-transforms. As rules we could have the 
rules of LI. It is now a hope that we chould end up with ana-
tural logic only changing the interpretations of 'f and 3: in 
LI • This hope is killed by the last sequent above, A::) 3:xFx ... 
... 3:x(A ::)Fx) • We would not want it provable since the corres-
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ponding propositional sequent 
A:::> B vc .... (A=>B) v (A=>C) is not. 
Here we leave the Skolem-theory. 
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V. THE HERBRAND THEOREM 
We now come to the Herbrand theorem for LI • Here we can 
follow the entire theory of LK with only the obvious changes 
[3] • 
HERBRAND DOMAIN As in LK • 
X HERBRAND TRANSFORM H 
TT ,.2 ' H.$ Hn as in LK . 
HERBRAND MORPHISM df~ ~ 9 df~ Jfn as in LK with only the 
' 
obvious changes. 
As in LK the theorems are obvious. 
THEOREM 
u? x 9 dfC1\ , Jfn are falsifiability morphisms. a-l TT ,~ d./ 
THEOREM 
tionistic 
If £) 1 ~ 9J2 and Jf~,21 (f) 
forest, then also cffx (~) . 
TT ,fl> 2 
is a secure intui-
THEOREM If Y" is a secured intui tionistic forest~ then there 
is 3J with Jf..~(7) secured, and N with dfN(Y) secured. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As an interesting result we note that the Herbrand theory 
works as in classical logic. The problems come in the Skolem 
theory, and more specifically in YLr r _. l':. -=-> J7ir S(r _. 6.) • 
There are many ways to formulate what goes wrong. Here is 
one: 
Consider the analyzing intuitionistic forests as the system-
atic way of producing possible falsifying Kripke-models. In such 
a falsifying Kripke-model we must give solutions to the general 
quantifiers. Now when we perform the Skolem morphism we forces 
a too strong uniformity on the solutions of the general quanti-
fiers. (This is a way of expressing what goes wrong with obstruc-
tion 2 which is the most serious obstruction.) 
In addition the Skolem morphisms forces us only to consider 
Kripke-models of constant domains as possible falsifying Kripke-
models. (Here we have obstruction 1.) 
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